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ESTRATÉGIAS COMPETITIVAS E A TEORIA DOS JOGOS: UMA ANÁLISE DOS VENCEDORES DO 35º LEILÃO DE ENERGIA NOVA NO BRASIL
Resumo
Este artigo examina as estratégias de organizações vencedoras no 35º Leilão de Energia Nova no Brasil, com foco nas fontes de Biomassa e Fotovoltaica. Usando a Teoria dos Jogos e a estrutura de sub-jogos de Reinhard Selten, o estudo analisa como essas organizações se posicionam em leilões descendentes, com dados da CCEE de 2015 a 2024. O modelo ALICE calcula o ponto de equilíbrio (PE) e testa quatro hipóteses sobre a racionalidade dos agentes, validadas por ANOVA e testes post-hoc de Tukey. Os resultados revelam que os vencedores de leilões de biomassa adotaram estratégias não racionais, focando na vitória, enquanto os vencedores de leilões fotovoltaicos seguiram estratégias racionais e não cooperativas. A maioria das empresas vencedoras é novata nesse formato e iniciará a geração de energia em janeiro de 2026.
Palavras- Chave: Tomada de Decisão Estratégica; Teoria dos Jogos; Leilões de Energia
ABSTRACT
This article examines the strategies of winning organizations in the 35th New Energy Auction in Brazil, focusing on Biomass and Photovoltaic sources. Using Game Theory and Reinhard Selten's subgame structure, the study analyzes how these organizations position themselves in descending auctions, with data from CCEE from 2015 to 2024. The ALICE model calculates the equilibrium point (EP) and tests four hypotheses about agents' rationality, validated by ANOVA and Tukey's post-hoc tests. The results reveal that the winners of biomass auctions adopted non-rational strategies, focusing on victory, while the winners of photovoltaic auctions followed rational and nonvooperative strategies. Most of the winning companies are new to this format and will start energy generation in January 2026.
Keywords: Strategic Decision-Making; Game Theory; Energy Auctions.
RESUMEN
Este artículo examina las estrategias de las organizaciones ganadoras en la 35ª Subasta de Energía Nueva en Brasil, enfocándose en fuentes de Biomasa y Fotovoltaica. Utilizando la Teoría de Juegos y la estructura de sub-juegos de Reinhard Selten, el estudio analiza cómo estas organizaciones se posicionan en subastas descendentes, con datos del CCEE de 2015 a 2024. El modelo ALICE calcula el punto de equilibrio (PE) y prueba cuatro hipótesis sobre la racionalidad de los agentes, validadas por ANOVA y pruebas post-hoc de Tukey. Los resultados revelan que los ganadores de las subastas de biomasa adoptaron estrategias no racionales, enfocándose en la victoria, mientras que los ganadores de las subastas fotovoltaicas siguieron estrategias racionales y no cooperativas. La mayoría de las empresas ganadoras son novatas en este formato y comenzarán la generación de energía en enero de 2026.
Palabras Clave: Toma de Decisiones Estratégicas; Teoría de Juegos; Subastas de Energía
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