Interpretation of the value of human rights in the context of modern forms of legal understanding

Maryna A. Panforova, Оleksandra Ye. Prots, Vira O. Kachur, Khrystyna M. Moriak-Protopopova, Liudmyla S. Protosavitska

Resumo


A long-term discussion about legal understanding has identified some main approaches to defining its concept, in particular among them: natural law and positive law. In this context, the question of the value of human rights in the context of these types of legal understanding is fundamental to legal science. Considering the above, inter alia, it is also important to find out whether human rights are natural or whether they require formal recognition and consolidation, being positive. The aim of the study is to consider the main features of the interpretation of the value of human rights in the context of natural and positive types of legal understanding, as well as to compare them. Consideration of the subject of research was carried out within the framework of an integrated approach, which involves a combination of such special methods as structural-functional, comparative-legal and formal-legal analysis methods. The article examines the two most popular types of legal understanding, in particular, natural law and legal positivism. According to positive law, human rights should be enshrined in laws, regulations and sources of legal norms. It should be noted that in the modern world, law, which includes human rights, is understood as a system of legal norms that are issued and protected by the state, which to a greater extent reflects a positive legal understanding. The essence of the theory of natural law is that in addition to positive law, which is created by the state, there is a common natural law for all people, standing above positive law. That is why natural law is realized in positive law and becomes its content. Thus, human rights and freedoms enshrined in the generally recognized principles and norms of international law have become the criterion of the legal basis for national systems of positive law.


Palavras-chave


legal understanding; lex naturalis; natural law; positivism; international law

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21902/Revrima.v2i31.5461

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