



ABOUT THE MEASURE OF SOCIAL: PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

SOBRE A MEDIDA DO SOCIAL: ASPECTOS FILOSÓFICOS E POLÍTICOS

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ABSTRACT

Objective: This study aims to explore the multifaceted concept of "the social" as both a philosophical and political phenomenon, analyzing its ambiguity and its manifestations in historical and contemporary contexts.

Methods: The research adopts a dialectical approach, employing historical and logical analysis, alongside the dialectics of essence and phenomenon, to examine the evolution of social relations.

Results: The analysis reveals that social relations often fail to achieve their intended "truly social" nature, remaining inauthentic due to their subjugation to systemic alienation and global capitalist structures. Despite this, the study identifies glimpses of genuine sociality in historical examples, emphasizing the Soviet era's partial realization of sociality as a case of progress. It also critiques globalism for obscuring the political and economic inequalities embedded within social systems, highlighting its contribution to the erosion of authentic sociality.

Conclusion: The research concludes that humanity, as the measure of the social, provides a transformative lens for evaluating and reconstructing social relations. Genuine sociality necessitates moving beyond forced cooperation to foster unmotivated human relationships that prioritize the development of individuals as ends rather than means. This framework offers valuable insights for addressing contemporary challenges in law, political science, and international relations, especially in the context of global transformations.

Keywords: Social; Social relations; Society; System of life; "Death of the social"; Globalism.





RESUMO

Objetivo: Este estudo visa explorar o conceito multifacetado de "social" como um fenômeno filosófico e político, analisando sua ambiguidade e suas manifestações em contextos históricos e contemporâneos.

Métodos: A pesquisa adota uma abordagem dialética, empregando análise histórica e lógica, juntamente com a dialética da essência e do fenômeno, para examinar a evolução das relações sociais.

Resultados: A análise revela que as relações sociais muitas vezes falham em atingir sua natureza "verdadeiramente social" pretendida, permanecendo inautênticas devido à sua subjugação à alienação sistêmica e às estruturas capitalistas globais. Apesar disso, o estudo identifica vislumbres de sociabilidade genuína em exemplos históricos, enfatizando a realização parcial da sociabilidade da era soviética como um caso de progresso. Ele também critica o globalismo por obscurecer as desigualdades políticas e econômicas embutidas nos sistemas sociais, destacando sua contribuição para a erosão da sociabilidade autêntica.

Conclusão: A pesquisa conclui que a humanidade, como medida do social, fornece uma lente transformadora para avaliar e reconstruir as relações sociais. A sociabilidade genuína necessita ir além da cooperação forçada para promover relacionamentos humanos desmotivados que priorizem o desenvolvimento de indivíduos como fins em vez de meios. Esta estrutura oferece insights valiosos para abordar desafios contemporâneos em direito, ciência política e relações internacionais, especialmente no contexto de transformações globais.

Palavras-chave: Social; Relações sociais; Sociedade; Sistema de vida; "Morte do social"; Globalismo.

1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of "social" is ambiguous. And the different meanings (denotations) of this name have not only different meanings, but even meanings "inside" the meaning. In the most common case, "social" means the same as "social", that is, referring to society in the sense of its opposite to "natural" (social or social relations; man as a social being – recall Aristotle's definition: man is πολιτικὸν ζῷον). "Social" is also used to refer to separate areas within this social organism – society – the social sphere, which refers to forms and methods of human activity other than the material, industrial, economic sphere (education, health, leisure, civic practice, etc.). "Social" can also be used in a sense close to the content of the concept of "socialization", that is, as a kind of entry of an individual into an established society with its relations, traditions, rules, instilling in a person values and norms of human community, contributing either to the cultivation of a person in accordance with a given historical level of sociality, or to his familiarization with this, a specific social community (group, clan, profession, etc.), that is, to the relationships and values characteristic of this





community or form of activity. Just as an individual is a carrier of social consciousness, i.e. public morality, psychology, legal awareness, etc., although they have a social origin, he is also a carrier of sociality, "truth" and "shame" from the myth of Protagoras from Plato's dialogue "Protagoras". And in this sense, it really is πολιτικὸν ζῶον not only by origin, but also by its nature, by the manifestations of its subjectivity. Also, when we contrast the "inner" in a person as spiritual or mental (although it is, of course, derived from the social in the sense of social development, evolution) with the "external", that is, not only natural conditions, but also historical, political, economic conditions of human existence, we designate the latter, that is, it is external as a "social". "Social" may also mean interindividual relations or relations between groups of people (of different communities) due to their social status. But even in such an expression, for example, as "the social conditionality of culture (philosophy, art, science, religion, etc.)" we mean a different meaning of the concept of social, although all the above forms are forms of precisely human, that is, social, social forms of being and are a product of social development. Finally, the "social" can be contrasted as something not truly human, as the fetters of man, his tyrant, with the natural, the natural as truly human, in the case, for example, when freedom is understood as a generic human quality, but baseless, or, as in the ancient Greek sophists, with the antinomy of "existing by nature" and "existing by (public) institutions". However, all these types of social in different ways, however, are tied to one thing, which is implied in all of them, manifests itself in various ways and to varying degrees, and the underdevelopment of which just causes these oppositions. More information about the social is indicated in the research of Kemerov (2012). The understanding of the social in Western sociological and philosophical literature are discussed in the (Furs, 2005; Giddens, 2003; Gromov et al., 1996; Joas & Knöbl, 2011; Ritzer, 2002; Stevenson, 2004; Webster, 2004).

2 METHODS

The analysis of the problem under consideration assumes, first of all, reliance on the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete, which allows you to see all the concrete variety of ambiguous manifestations of the "social" and thereby highlight such a concept as a measure of the social. The cognitive potential of the dialectic of one and many, essence and phenomenon, logical and historical, form and content is used.





3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The social can be a subject, a predicate, or both. In the definition of any social object (thing), there are relations – they are "twisted" in it, they are in a connected form, for example: capital is a self-increasing value. Moreover, it is not only the Hegelian idea that "Everything that exists is in relation, and this relation is the truth of all existence" (Hegel, 2010, p. 101). Here (in Hegel) it is emphasized, as far as we understand, the universal interconnection of things, that every thing is "throughout its life" at any given moment in different relationships with other things, and only through these relationships, through the prism of these relationships, in the totality of these relationships, it reveals itself as itself, its nature What is it or "the truth of its existence". A thing cannot be said to "freeze" in order to understand what it is – on the contrary, in this position it will always be a "thing in itself", but never a "thing for us" (at best, an appearance): a hand detached from its whole, from relationships and movements in it, from the body (organism), is anything but a hand.

However, when we say "there is always a relation in the definition", we do not mean only that. Every social thing is not just "in relation", but represents the objectification of relations, which allows you to name certain things (for example, a person, an object) or interacting things (for example, a person and a person, a person and an object) are social, their relations are social (even if it is a natural thing, but included in human activity (relations) is a social thing, say, growing trees, climate change, shallowing rivers; in this case, the social is understood in a broad sense as identical to the social). And the very plane of being, in which the interacting things and this relationship itself are placed, is called the word social. This is so, because social, first of all, there is a certain attitude, "pure energy", if I may say so. This is how the "relation" is defined in the German "Philosophical Dictionary", founded by G. Schmidt (2003): "The material or semantic unity, interdependence, mutual definability ... of existences having a subjective or objective, abstract or concrete form" (p. 352). And a social thing is, thus, a relationship framed in a kind of design, objectivity, held by a partition of materiality, which gives these relations objectivity, qualitative certainty of this thing, its "identity". But what kind of relationship? What kind of existences are we talking about? What binds these relations into unity and gives this unity certainty precisely as a social one?

Here we must recall what was said above, that the social is distinguished in different senses. The social as identical to the social, that is, related to society in general (the world of a social person) in the sense of its opposite to the "natural", first of all. The mechanisms





and factors that determine the specifics of the social each time ultimately mediate other meanings of the social, suggesting differences between (social) "things", not just commonality. But in any case, all this is derived from what is called society, society and the specifics of this subject (society, society) as qualitative certainty determines what is fundamental in the social, various forms of the social are the result of those relationships that occur within a given subject and with this subject. However, just as not every object can fully correspond to its concept, not every social, that is, related to society, can fully express this society by its definition, that is, it may not be fully social or truly social. This is similar to what E. Gilson (1995) says about the medieval scholastics: they "consider themselves philosophers, and in fact they are, but first of all, of course, they are theologians... having become philosophers, they do not become philosophers to the end" (pp. 42-43). Thus, the question arises about the extent of this social.

Let's explain. Sometimes they talk about the "death of the social". Is it more than just a figure of speech? Yes, if only to clarify its meaning, as we see it. It is clear that we are not talking about the social as identical to the social, because this would simply mean the death of society (humanity). Neither does it mean the sphere of social (public), since the multifaceted public itself is alive. Obviously, "stagnation" cannot be implied, when everything remains and nothing happens – this is a literary utopia.

Consequently, we can talk (when we talk about the social as a relation and about the "death of the social") about such an aspect of the social (that is, related to society), which can be considered as a mode, that is, as a property of an object inherent in it only in some states. In other words, social is an attitude that does not always belong to the "object" (in our case, social relations), and may not belong. Therefore, this implies distinguishing "social" (as referring to society in general) from "social" (as due, expressing the completeness of its definition) and means that the public is not always social. This "does not belong to the subject" can be considered as the "death of the social", although it should be more accurate to say dying.

But then, in which "states" is it inherent and in which it is not? Therefore, what is meant by social relations (social) with us, the "death" of which can occur?

To make the essence of what has been said about genuine sociality clear, let's turn to this. The Russian thinker G. P. Fedotov somewhere has the expression "not supported by the general flow of life", expressed in the context of the idea that the establishment of genuine human relations, their humanization, to use the term often used today, is not





supported by the general flow of life. What does it mean? This means that the "general flow [system] of life", that is, social relations do not contain (are deprived, have lost, have not achieved) those qualities, abilities that make them powerful (because they are adequate) to produce truly human relations. Moreover, they (public relations) are such that they "do not support", they are "disgusted" with precisely such production of public relations as inadequate, contrary to their "nature" (and even if they "wanted", then objectively, by their nature, again, they "cannot" "support"). In other words, social relations as human relations (by definition), that is, such relations that, although formed from the need to build inter-individual ties "along the line of forced cooperation," but assume unmotivated (economically, economically, consumerally, etc.) relationships for the realization of their "self" (genuine humanity), these social relations cease to be such, they become perverted, false, inauthentic, in the sense of conformity to their nature (nature), human nature. But they only remain social relations "along the line of forced cooperation".

But the transition of social relations from the stage of "forced cooperation" (physical, economic necessity, need, rationality) to the level of relations thus unmotivated is the transition to a truly social, the acquisition of sociality by social relations. Therefore, the expression that "social relations become perverted, false, inauthentic" means that they cease to be or have not yet become social, truly social. And thus, the criterion of the latter can only be the measure of humanity in the sense mentioned above. What is it about?

In connection with alienation, Marx (1974) says back in the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844" that

it turns out that a person (a worker) feels free to act only when performing his animal functions - when eating, drinking, in sexual intercourse, at best still settling in his home, decorating himself and so on – and in his human functions he feels only like an animal. What is inherent in the animal becomes the lot of man, and the human turns into what is inherent in the animal. However, eating, drinking, sexual intercourse, etc. are also truly human functions. But in abstraction, which separates them from the circle of other human activities and turns them into the last and only final goals, they have an animal character (p. 91).

And in the "Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1859" we read: "The alienation and independence in which this [material] connection still exists in relation to individuals only prove that people are still in the process of creating the conditions of their social life, and do not already live a social life, starting from these conditions" (Marx, 1968, p. 73). The creation of a "man of his social life" is the process of creating a "universal" (Marx) man, in joint activity with others like himself, producing "universal spiritual labor", i.e. a person focuses on his





social (human) abilities, in other words, on the development of his personality as a goal of social development. This is the same as saying that a person is always a goal, but never a means of development.

The transformation of social relations into those that would lead to the creation of "a person's own social life" is the first acquisition of genuine sociality, which people "do not yet live". But it also follows from this that social relations functioning in a cut, in suppression, or in the direction from the creation of "man's own social life" are relations devoid of genuine sociality, leading away from it, not socially developed (underdeveloped), there is a torn social existence.

It would not be an exaggeration to say, therefore, that there have been no periods in the history of mankind when public relations had a truly social character. Only a short period of the heyday of Soviet civilization demonstrated the effective possibility of social relations (fundamentally, by their nature during the period of Soviet civilization) acquiring a truly social character in the sense implied above (movement in this direction, at least).

However, limiting ourselves to the above would clearly not be enough to understand the ambiguity and complexity of the social problem.

Indeed, the main thing remains true if we consider the human as a measure of the social: the previous history was the history of a "partial person", far from the fact that we had a movement towards the development of personality as a goal. Even the modern information society, the "knowledge economy", which is so very different from previous class societies, and, at first glance, makes irrelevant the former political and economic tools of social analysis, does not change the essence of things, if we remember that knowledge is a value, is a commodity, being objectified in the results of production, mediated by the method of production. Therefore, the relations and goals of production are decisive here. There is even more fog swirling around one of the latest products of ideological consciousness – "globalism", which is, in essence, a euphemism designed to obscure, or even completely hide the political, economic, and social essence of the processes denoted by this word. Only the technical and technological sides of the process stick out, or it boils down to a rather neutral (in terms) transition from closed (national) economies to an "open economy" (or "global", as stated in one of the works of Western sociologists (Brown & Lauder, 2004). Meanwhile, two qualities can be distinguished in "globalism": internal, related to the political, economic and social content of this concept, and external, "visible", expressing a set of phenomena and processes presented in the form of social and economic activity mediated





by scientific and technological progress, the introduction of high technologies, etc. But the latter always occurs only within a certain type of society, mode of production and system of social relations that set certain goals and priorities of socio-economic activity. So, the internal (political and economic) basis of modern globalism is, therefore, predetermined by its other aspects, the capitalist mode of production and the imperialist nature of the claims of capitalism.

And although, measured by the measure outlined above, the degree of sociality of social relations in these latter societies is different than in previous ones (for example, in slave-owning or early industrial ones), we can also say about them as underdeveloped in terms of sociality: This is well found in the existential manifestations of the "era of globalism", such, for example, its forms as a consumer society, when people, according to J. Baudrillard (2020), surrounded "not so much as it was at all times by other people, as by objects of consumption" (p. 5). We just need to remember that here we need to approach historically, pay attention to the essence, and the existential manifestations of the inauthentic sociality of public relations, of course, are different in different historical epochs, but each time has its own measure of due, equality, freedom, etc. People often tend to mistake a change in form for a change in content too, especially when these forms strongly contradict the traditional content associated with this form (for example, comparing classical slavery or the "classic" form of capitalist exploitation, on the one hand, and a consumer society, a "society of abundance", creating the illusion of universal equality and democracy, – on the other). But this can be deceptive, as Baudrillard brilliantly showed. Let us confine ourselves to just one of his conclusions: "An alienated person is not only a reduced, impoverished, but inviolable person in his essence – this is an inverted person who has turned into evil and an enemy to himself...Alienation is the very structure of a trading society" (Baudrillard, 2020, p. 36).

4 CONCLUSION

Nevertheless, the earlier statement that "there have been no periods in the history of mankind when public relations had a truly social character" should be treated not abstractly and dogmatically, but concretely and dialectically. That is, in this regard, we can agree that we can probably talk about progress, about changes, about a "greater or lesser" approximation to the definition, that not everything is equally false. At the same time, we





must admit, keeping in mind the modern world, modern social (global) relations: we cannot say for sure (with regard to their truly social nature) that the further away from the "dark ages", the more they (relations) are in a situation where four are mistaken for five, rather than in a situation where he is mistaken for a thousand." Apparently, the "death" of the social (in the sense justified above) is a circulating process, the social is Osiris - the dying and resurrecting god.

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